## **REMARKS**

In the Official Action mailed on **15 December 2005**, the Examiner reviewed claims 1-11, 13-29, 31-47, and 49-54. Claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, 26, 27, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 40, 41, 44, 45, 49, 51, 52, and 54 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Bruce Schneier (Applied Cryptography 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Oct. 1995, John Wiley & Sons Pub. pages 43-57, hereinafter "Schneier") in view of Medvinski et al (Public Key Utilizing Tickets for Application Servers, hereinafter "Medvinski") and Kohl et al (The Kerberos Network Authentication Service, Network Working Group Request For Comments (RFC) 1510, Sept. 1993, hereinafter "Kohl"). Claims 14, 17, 32, 35, 50, and 53 were rejected as being unpatentable over Schneier in view of Medvinski and Official Notice (hereinafter "ON"). Claims 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 29, 38, 39, 42, 43, 46, and 47 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schneier in view of Medvinski and Sirbu et al (Public Key Based Ticket Granting service in Kerberos, hereinafter "Sirbu") and ON.

## Rejections under 35 U.S.C. §103(a)

Independent claims 1, 19, and 37 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Schneier in view of Medvinski and Kohl.

Applicant respectfully points out that both Medvinski and Kohl teach away from the present invention.

Kohl describes the Kerberos network authentication system, which provides a means of verifying the identities of principals on an open network. Kerberos allows a client to obtain a "ticket" from a key distribution center (KDC) which enables the client to (a) authenticate itself to a server and (b) initiate a secure session with the server. Note that Kerberos uses a **long-term secret key** (with "**long lifetime**") which is shared between the KDC and the server to seal the ticket (see Kohl, section 1.3, definitions for "secret key" and "ticket").

Before a client can obtain a ticket for a server, the client and server must authenticate themselves with the KDC. PKINIT extends Kerberos so that clients and servers can use public key cryptography to authenticate themselves with the KDC. But, after authentication, a "client can proceed in a normal fashion, using the conventional Kerberos ticket" (see Medvinski, last paragraph of section 4). Furthermore, Medvinski describes "how, without any modification, the PKINIT specification may be used to implement the ideas introduced in PKDA" (see Medvinski, Abstract). In other words, Medvinski uses a long-term secret key to generate a ticket because PKINIT uses the conventional Kerberos ticket which uses a long-term secret key.

In contrast, the present invention is specifically directed towards generating and storing a temporary secret key with a limited lifespan at the KDC. This temporary secret key can be subsequently used to facilitate communications between a client and the server. Furthermore, the temporary secret key becomes invalid after a specified time interval (the lifespan), and therefore have to be **regenerated** either periodically, or upon request from the KDC(see page 11, lines 10-14).

Examiner argues that Kohl explicitly teaches that fact that a temporary secret key that becomes invalid after a specified time in Kohl, Section 3.1.5, final paragraph and Section 3.3.3 final paragraph. Application respectfully points out that in these Sections of Kohl, the referred "expiration times" are associated with either a "session key" or a "sub-session key", but not a secrete key (see Kohl, section 1.3, definitions for "session key", "sub-session key", and "secret key").

Note that the session key is different from the secret key. First of all, the secret key is shared by a principal and the KDC, and is stored at KDC. In contrast, the session key is generated at the time that two principals (e.g., a client and a server) need to establish communications, and then shared by the two principals. Secondly, the lifetime or lifespan of the session key is associated with a communication session, while the lifetime of the secrete key is not associated

with a communication session. Thirdly, the temporary secret key is used to create a ticket by "encrypting an identifier for the client and the session key with the temporary secret key," in the instant application, while the session key is used for direct communication between the client and the server. Hence, Kohl does not reveal a temporary secret key that becomes invalid after a specified time.

Using a temporary secret key which is stored at the KDC is advantageous because it reduces the vulnerability at the KDC. Note that vulnerability is reduced because the temporary key will become invalid after a specified time period (see page 9, lines 24-26), and a new temporary secret key is subsequently generated to replaced the expired temporary secret key (see page 11, lines 10-14). Furthermore, managing temporary secret keys is not obvious because it involves the complex operations shown in FIG. 2.

Accordingly, Applicant has amended independent claims 1, 19, and 37 to clarify that invalidating the temporary secret key after a specified time, and replacing the expired temporary secret key with a new temporary secret key reduces the vulnerability of the KDC. These amendments find support on page 9, lines 24-26, and page 11, lines 10-14.

Hence, Applicant respectfully submits that independent claims 1, 19, and 37 as presently amended are in condition for allowance. Applicant also submits that claims 2-11 and 13-18, which depend upon claim 1, claims 21-29 and 31-36, which depend upon claim 19, and claims 38-47 and 49-54, which depend upon claim 37, are for the same reasons in condition for allowance and for reasons of the unique combinations recited in such claims.

## **CONCLUSION**

It is submitted that the present application is presently in form for allowance. Such action is respectfully requested.

Respectfully submitted,

В

Edward J. Grundler Registration No. 47,615

Date: 15 March 2006

Edward J. Grundler PARK, VAUGHAN & FLEMING LLP 2820 Fifth Street Davis, CA 95616

Tel: (530) 759-1663 FAX: (530) 759-1665

Email: edward@parklegal.com